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The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Within the American Response to
Domestic Corruption
Henry H. Rossbacher* & Tracy W.
Young*
I. Introduction
In King Henry VIII, Cardinal Wolsey, in his final speech of
expiation, urges Cromwell to act honorably, arguing: "corruption
wins not more than honesty."1 Hopefully, the radical nature of
this sentiment did not cause the historic burning of the Globe
Theatre during the inaugural performances of the play.' Just as
Wolsey's recantation of his past sins and practices came a little too
late with much too little, so American and, especially, international
anti-corruption efforts have been either nonexistent or, at the least,
largely admonitory.
* Henry H. Rossbacher (B.S.Ec. 1965, Wharton School of Finance and
Commerce, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1968, University of Virginia, Phi
Delta Phi) is the principal of Rossbacher & Associates, a law firm situated in Los
Angeles, California, which specializes in civil, criminal and appellate litigation in
all state and federal courts. He is also Advisory Counsel to the Independent
Counsel in In re Secretary of Agriculture Espy. The views expressed herein in no
way reflect the views of the Independent Counsel and are not made in an official
capacity.
** Tracy W. Young (B.A. cum laude 1977, New York University; J.D. 1983,
Cardozo School of Law, New York) is a Senior Attorney with Rossbacher &
Associates.
1. William Shakespeare, KING HENRY VIII, Act 3, Scene 2, Line 444 (New
Cambridge Shakespeare 1996).
2. Introduction, KING HENRY VIII, supra at 1-4. Britain has hardly been
a leader in anti-corruption efforts, as this headline shows: "Britain Spurns US Over
Bribes." The article noted that
Britain has refused to join other government in immediate
action against bribery and corruption in trade between deve-
loped and developing countries. An appeal by a senior United
States official for Britain to adopt measures to prevent compa-
nies paying bribes to obtain contracts overseas has failed to
change the Government's stance.
Britain Spurns U.S. Over Bribes, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 3, 1994.
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Wolsey's adjuration is unreflected in the international business
climate of today. Regrettably, bribery, and corruption, endemic to
certain cultures and a mainstay of human greed, is now, as it has
always been, a thorn in our righteous side. Corruption is as old as
man. Yet throughout history good men have fought back. The
Bible condemns corruption throughout, from the Old Testament's
fire and brimstone threats of destruction after "God looked on the
earth, and... [beheld], it was corrupt,"' to the New Testament's
more poetic approach, "[flor oppression makes a wise man mad,
and a bribe corrupts the heart.""
In addition to religious condemnation, man has also fought
back with laws seeking to expose and punish various forms of
corruption. This article will address primarily that insidious form
of corruption known as bribery, as well as the international aspects
of corruption by bribery within the context of the American
response to domestic corruption.
Until the Watergate scandals and the Nixon debacle during the
1970s, there was no specific law curbing the practice of Americans
and American businesses bribing foreign officials, and the Govern-
ment did not express any official concern about such practices. The
Watergate scandal and the resulting investigation of illegal domestic
political contributions helped to focus attention on what America
would soon learn was a shockingly prevalent practice-the bribery
of foreign officials by American nationals.
When the magnitude of the problem was finally exposed, the
public outcry was deafening. Public Congressional hearings
revealed that numerous prominent corporations, including
Lockheed, Exxon, and Gulf Oil, had engaged in bribery on a grand
scale. The hearings resulted in a call for legislation. Corruption
was seen as antithetical to the concept of "pure" competition which
undergirds America's history of capitalism and free-market
enterprise.'
The resulting legislation, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
("the Act"), signed into law by then-President Jimmy Carter on
December 19, 1977, and passed by both houses of Congress without
3. See Genesis 6:12-13.
4. See Ecclesiastes 7:7.
5. Pines, Comment, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include
a Private Right ofAction, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 185, 186-88 (1994) (hereinafter Pines);
see Donald R. Cruver, Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, a Guide
for U.S. Firms Doing Business in the International Market Place, 1-5 (ABA 1994)
(hereinafter Cruver). The Cruver pamphlet is an excellent treatment of the Act
aimed at compliance issues.
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a single dissenting vote. The Passage of the Act was sweeping, yet
appeared to be relatively ineffective in curbing the problem it
addresses. I will discuss the details of the Act in a moment, but
suffice it to say, it has not been demonstrably effective in eradica-
ting the problem in American corporations or, more tellingly, in
enlisting foreign cooperation in joint efforts to reform international
business practices. The Act does not, however, represent an
imperialist extension of unprecedented prohibitions solely to
foreigners but, instead, extends American domestic rules to the
foreign activities of American economic participants.
II. The American Domestic Anti-Corruption Response
A. The Law's Prohibitions
America's shock was not confined to foreign sins of American
corporations; increased scrutiny was primarily directed at domestic
offenses. Throughout the years since the 1970s, the American
response to domestic corruption has led to a sweeping series of
laws attempting to constrain and punish politicians and Govern-
ment bureaucrats and those who seek to corruptly influence them.
Punishments, in fact, vary - some swift, some sure, some illusory -
but all are aimed at eradication of domestic corruption. I include
a brief sketch here of the domestic scene so that the American
foreign anti-corruption initiative can be seen to fit relatively
comfortably within the American domestic scheme.
The first set of prohibitions affects our federal appointed
officials. These strictures are based on federal statutes, regulations
and executive orders.6 The laws provide not only ethical rules but
also severe criminal sanctions for illegal acceptance of bribes,
gratuities, and salaries from private parties or from any source
other than the Government. The laws penalize equally the payer
6. The most current and comprehensive compendium of these legal
restrictions are contained in STANDARDS OF ETHICAL CONDUCT FOR EMPLOYEES
OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH U.S. OFFICE OF GOV'T ETHICS (1996). The
publication cites and explains, with extensive discussion and examples, the rules
and procedures. It also contains a comprehensive list of related statutes of
Government-wide application. It does not cover statutes limited in application to
a particular Government Department (e.g., Meat Inspection Act of 1907, Title 21,
U.S.C. §§ 601-691, applicable to employees of the Department of Agriculture).
A more limited guide is also published by the Do IT RIGHT UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS (1995). Both are available for modest sums
from the United States Government Printing Office in Washington, D.C.
1997]
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and the recipient of the proscribed payments.7 In brief, corruption
is a crime, thelrules are strict, and prosecution can be merciless!
The second set of prohibitions affects Senators and Represen-
tatives. These rules, issued internally by the Senate and House of
Representatives, have recently been tightened. In brief, they
supplement the applicable criminal statutes, limiting and requiring
the reporting of gifts to federal legislators.'
A third source of restraints is the federal laws governing and
restricting both the giving and the reporting of campaign contribu-
tions. These laws require extensive reporting, enforced by civil and
criminal penalties, and place restraints upon amounts and, in
particular, corporate contributions, whether made directly or
disguised through conduits. The laws have led to both civil
proceedings brought by the Federal Election Commission and
prosecutions brought by both the Department of Justice and
various Independent Counsel.10
7. See Title 18, U.S.C. §§ 201-225. For the United States Department of
Justice's views on public corruption laws and prosecutions, see generally THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL, Vol. 9A, Chapters 85 and 85A (PH Law &
Business).
8. Violations of the United States' domestic laws can also have international
consequences. Oliver North, the loyal foot soldier of the Iran-Contra mess, was
convicted of taking an illegal gratuity in the form of a security system for his home
in return for his covert work funding the Contras in El Salvador. Although that
conviction was ultimately reversed on procedural grounds, it reflects the American
approach to domestic corruption. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, modified,
920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
9. The Senate Gifts Rule, effective January 1, 1996, is contained in Rule
XXXV (Gifts) of the Senate Rules. The Financial Disclosure Rule is Rule
XXXIV (Financial Disclosure). The Rules are explained and interpreted in a
March 27, 1996 Memorandum from the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Ethics
dated Mar. 27, 1996.
The House Gifts Rule, Rule LII (52), is explained and interpreted in a
Memorandum from the House's Committee on Standards of Official Conduct
dated Dec. 7, 1995. Each Rule is enforced by the relevant Congressional
committee and, ultimately, by action of the relevant House of Congress. The
custom is for the concerned committee to hire an independent lawyer to conduct
the investigation. A current example is the pending investigation of the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich, by the House Committee and its
retained independent counsel. Violations of criminal laws that are uncovered are
referred to the Department of Justice; however, all discovered violations may form
the basis for House or Senate discipline.
10. See Title 2, U.S.C. §§ 431-455, the Federal Election Campaign Act. The
Act establishes a comprehensive set of restrictions and reporting requirements,
enforced primarily by the Federal Election Commission (FECA). The Act
provides for criminal prosecutions by the Department of Justice as well as
extensive civil proceedings by the Commission. The force of these statutes is
exemplified by the recent conviction of Sun Diamond Growers of California, a
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A fourth source of domestic restrictions has been the United
States Securities Laws. Publicly traded corporations in the United
States are subject to a number of restrictions and requirements
aimed at accurate and public disclosure of certain financial
information. These laws also impose the requirement to make and
keep books, records, and accounts which, in reasonable detail,
accurately and fairly reflect the corporations' transactions and the
disposition of their assets. These laws have criminal penalties for
their violation and have been applied to both illegal campaign
contributions and to bribes."
The next general set of proscriptions typically involved
includes requirements that communications with the federal
government and its investigators be truthful. Aside from the
specific reporting and disclosure requirements, prosecutions often
deal with attempts through false statements and misrepresentations
mammoth agricultural cooperative in California with reported sales of $670,000,000
annually, of, inter alia, one count of making a prohibited political contribution to
former Secretary of Agriculture Michael Espy's brother Henry (a Congressional
candidate) in violation of 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), and four counts of violating 2 U.S.C.
§ 441f by making the contribution through four individuals in an attempt to
conceal the source of the contributions. Other convictions include payment of
prohibited gratuities (18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A)) and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1343
and 1346). Total penalties on the conviction include a maximum fine of
$2,500,000. Criminal penalties for FECA violations are contained in 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3571-3573. See In re Secretary of Agriculture Espy. United States v. Sun
Diamond Growers of California, Cr. No. 96-0193 (D.C. 1996).
The case of Michael Goland is an excellent example of cases brought by the
Department of Justice for violations of the election laws. The extensive litigation
history is set forth in three separate opinions by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. United States v. Goland, 859 F.2d 405, 959 F.2d
1449, 977 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1990 & 1992). Goland was convicted of making an
illegal campaign contribution to a candidate for the U.S. Senate in violation of 2
U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(A) and 437(d). His challenges to this criminal conviction as
well as an attempt to have the Act declared unconstitutional, Goland v. United
States, 903 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1990), proved unavailing and he ultimately served
a prison term.
. 11. Alleged domestic violations typically include keeping fake books and
records (15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A) and 78ff(a)), falsification of accounting records
(15 U.S.C.§ 78ff(a) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1), false statements to the corpora-
tion's auditors (15 U.S.C. § 77ff(a)) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2), and securities
fraud (15 U.S.C. 99 771(a) and 77x). An example is the indictment of Crop
Growers Corporation, a publicly traded corporation engaged in marketing federal
agricultural insurance on behalf of insurance companies together with its Chairman
of the Board of Directors and Executive Vice President. United States v. Crop
Growers Corporation, Hemmingson & Black, No. 96-0181 (D.D.C. 1996). The gist
of the securities charges were that Crop Growers Corporation and its executives
funneled illegal campaign contributions to Henry Espy, the Secretary of
Agriculture's brother, for his Congressional campaign. The prosecution was
brought by the Independent Counsel in re Secretary of Agriculture Espy.
1997]
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to conceal the wrongful conduct and deflect the investigation.
Federal criminal law penalizes false statements to a federal
agency. 2
Finally, the federal criminal laws penalize separately conspira-
cies to violate the law or to defraud the United States. Thus, both
the substantive offenses and the conspiracy to commit them in
concert are criminally proscribed.
13
The American response to corruption committed in the
domestic economy and polity is to criminalize not merely the bribe
itself but also all of the indicia of the illegal conduct. The laws are
constructed deliberately to attempt to deter illegal conduct by
forcing the participants to violate multiple laws in the process of
committing the corrupt act. This approach, as we will see eventual-
ly in this paper, is precisely the approach of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act.
America, however, has not limited itself to enacting compre-
hensive laws; it has attempted to insulate the prosecution in
politically sensitive cases through the use of "Independent Coun-
sel." The American experience has justified enactment of extraor-
dinary protections against conflicts of interest and undue influence
being brought to bear in situations where investigations implicate
officials of the Government. 14  No explanation of America's
12. Title 18, U.S.C. § 1001 provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any depart-
ment or agency of the United States knowingly-and willfully
falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device
a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statements or representations, or makes or uses any false
writing or document knowing the same to contain any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
13. Naturally, both a conspiracy to violate any federal criminal law and a
conspiracy to defraud the United States by impairing and impeding the lawful
functioning of its government and agencies are separate crimes carrying additional
criminal penalties. 18 U.S.C. § 371. Not unnaturally, these charges are often
present in corruption cases. A prime example is the Crop Growers Corporation
indictment, see supra note 11, which alleged, a conspiracy both to violate the
securities and other federal laws as well as to impede the lawful functioning of the
Federal Election Commission and false statements. Further, failure to report
bribes or gratuities would subject the recipient to potential liability for criminal
and civil violations of the Internal Revenue laws: 25 U.S.C. §§ 7203, 7206, etc. An
example is the recent prosecution in Los Angeles, California, of now-former
Congressman Walter Tucker for extorting $30,000 in bribes while Mayor of
Compton, California. The charges on which he was convicted included tax evasion
charges.
14. An excellent treatment of the historical record from the Bible to the
present is Professor Noonan's scholarly exegesis on the subject: JOHN T. NOONAN,
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attempts to battle corruption, thus, would be complete without a
brief description of this somewhat unusual feature of American law.
The Independent Counsel mechanism may also prove to be a
helpful model for other nations seeking to both combat corruption
and to insure that their anti-corruption efforts are perceived as
unbiased by political influence. A brief explanation follows.
B. Independent Counsel Law
1. Its Use in Domestic Corruption Prosecutions.-Where an
investigation focuses on an individual who is also a member of the
Executive Branch of the United States Government such as the
President, the various Cabinets, and the Department of Justice, the
prosecution of that individual may create a conflict of interest. In
those situations where the Executive Branch is incapable of investi-
gating itself, upon a request by the Attorney General, an Indepen-
dent Counsel is appointed by the Judicial Branch to conduct an
unbiased investigation and potential prosecution of criminal
violations by Government officials.15 Unlike the British system,
private lawyers in the United States normally cannot and do not act
as defense counsel one day and prosecutors the next. American
prosecutors are appointed by the federal or local state governments
exclusively to prosecute violations of the criminal laws.
The Independent Counsel statute was invoked to appoint
Lawrence E. Walsh to investigate the involvement of members of
the Reagan White House and Cabinet in the Iran-Contra de-
bacle. 6 It was also recently invoked to appoint an Independent
Counsel to investigate President Clinton's and his wife, Hillary's,
alleged involvement in the Whitewater investment scandal while
President Clinton was Governor of Arkansas. At present, there are
three Independent Counsel actively conducting investigations.
17
2. Brief History.-The Independent Counsel statute was
promulgated as part of the Ethics in Government Act (the "Ethics
JR., BRIBES (McMillan 1984). Chapters 15 through 20 chronicle America's
extensive and admitted familiarity both with the conduct and its prosecution.
15. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994).
16. See Secord v. Cockburn, 747 F. Supp.. 779 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
17. In addition to the Whitewater investigation, Independent Counsel actively
investigated the former Secretary of Agriculture Michael Espy and Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development Henry Cisneros. The investigation of Secretary
of Commerce Ron Brown was discontinued due to his death. The investigation
of the former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Samuel Pierce, is
finalizing its report.
1997]
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Act") passed in 1978.18 The Ethics Act was passed by Congress
to "create and reorganize certain agencies of the federal Govern-
ment and to enhance the probity of public officials and institu-
tions."19  The Ethics Act creating the Independent Counsel
provisions was intended to eradicate further abuses of presidential
power such as that displayed by then-President Nixon during the
Watergate affair.
At that time, "special prosecutors" appointed to investigate the
Executive Branch were not fully independent. After the burglary
at the Watergate Hotel in Washington led to allegations of
espionage and sabotage involving the Nixon administration, Nixon
ordered then Attorney General Elliot Richardson to appoint
Archibald Cox as the special prosecutor to investigate members of
the Executive Branch. After Cox demanded the production of
tapes and documents from the President, Nixon ordered the
Attorney General to dismiss Cox as special prosecutor. Both the
Attorney General and his deputy refused to carry out Nixon's
order, then resigned. Ultimately, then-Solicitor General Robert
Bork carried out Nixon's order and fired Cox.2°
Independent Counsel and the Ethics Act have since had a
rocky road. The Iran-Contra investigation, which took five years
and cost $32,000,000, was roundly criticized by Congress. Addi-
tionally, both the Iran-Contra investigation and the subsequent
debacle over reported loans by the United States to Iraq used by
Saddam Hussein to obtain weapons just before the invasion of
Kuwait, exposed weaknesses in the statute. Independent Counsel
Walsh was unable to obtain classified information held by the
Attorney General that was necessary for prosecutions of Iran-
Contra defendants. As for Iraq, the Attorney General refused to
request the appointment of an Independent Counsel, revealing the
inherent weakness of the statute which gives the Attorney General
sole discretion in this regard.2' Further problems have arisen over
disputes as to the extent of the grants of investigative jurisdiction
by the Attorney General and whether or not newly discovered
18. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, and 28 U.S.C.).
19. See John M. Kelly, Janet P. McEntee, Note, The Independent Counsel
Law: Is There Life After Death?, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 561 (1993).
20. Id. Bork's nomination as a Supreme Court Justice was eventually defeated
by the United States Senate. Many consider his role in firing Cox to have been
a significant factor in his rejection.
21. Id. at 574-79; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-592.
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matters are, or should be, within the purview of the Independent
Counsel.22
Congress failed to reauthorize the Independent Counsel
provisions of the Ethics Act in 1992.' The provisions were,
however, reenacted in 1994.24
III. The United States and Foreign Corruption Before the Act
A. The Reach of the Law
Domestic bribery, defined generically as the "offering, giving,
receiving, or soliciting of something of value for the purpose of
influencing the action of an official in the discharge of his or her
public or legal duties,"' had long been prosecuted as a crime by
both federal and state authorities in the United States, resulting in
extensive prison terms and fines. For example, the federal offense
of bribing a United States Government official can result in a
maximum sentence of fifteen years in prison.26 Before the enact-
ment of the Act in 1977, however, American corporations and
individuals caught bribing foreign officials could only be prosecuted
indirectly.27  Domestic bribery statutes did not directly reach
foreign activity.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, known colloquially
as the SEC, responded to revelations of foreign misconduct by
American entities by taking the position that United States
corporations were obligated to disclose payments to foreign officials
as part of the securities laws.' The SEC has jurisdiction to
regulate transactions in securities conducted on securities exchanges
and over-the-counter markets in the United States.29 Additional-
ly, federal prosecutors with the Department of Justice sought to
22. See In re Espy, 80 F.3d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1996); In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34
(D.C. Cir. 1987). As these cases show, these matters have not been without
controversy.
23. See supra, note 19, at 581-82.
24. See Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-270,
108 Stat. 732 (1994).
25. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 191 (6th Ed. 1990).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 201.
27. See Pines, supra note 5, at 185-88; see Defending Corporations and Their
Officers in Parallel Administrative and Criminal Proceedings and Their Avoidance
Through Preventive and Compliance Programs, American Bar Association
National Institute (hereinafter Defending Corporations) (1980); see Cruver, supra
note 5, at 1-5.
28. Pines, supra note 5, at 186-88.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78b.
1997]
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invoke the Bank Secrecy as well as the Mail and Wire Fraud
statutes.
30
The Bank Secrecy Act requires banks and other financial
institutions to submit reports to the Internal Revenue Service
disclosing transactions involving more than $10,000 in cash, or other
bearer negotiable instruments and to submit similar reports to the
United States Customs Service whenever transporting more than
$5,000 across the border. 1 The Mail and Wire Fraud statutes,
which prohibit the use of the United States mails and wire
communications to engage in a fraudulent scheme, are limited to
use of the United States mails and wire communications and thus
are not designed to deal with acts undertaken exclusively abroad.
Use of these laws to curb the particular practice of bribing foreign
officials has proven to be inadequate. 2
B. The Extent of the Problem
A voluntary disclosure program implemented by the SEC
during the first half of the 1970s revealed that more than 450
companies had made collectively over $400,000,000 in questionable
payments to foreign concerns. Over 117 of these companies were
ranked in the Fortune 500 listing. The corrupting activities engaged
in by these companies included bribery of high foreign officials to
secure favorable foreign government action, as well as facilitating
or "grease" payments made to ensure that lower level Government
employees performed desired ministerial functions."
The American public was shocked to learn that companies
such as Bell Helicopter, Gulf Oil, General Tire and Rubber, Exxon,
Occidental Petroleum, Lockheed, Mobil Oil and other prominent
corporations had engaged in such activities. For example, it was
disclosed that Lockheed paid $1,000,000 to Prince Bernhardt of the
Netherlands, who was forced to resign as a result of an inquiry into
the allegation. Gulf Oil reported spending $10,300,000 on gifts and
gratuities related to political activity in the United States and
abroad, including $4,000,000 given to the political party of South
Korean President Park Chung Hee.'4
30. See The Bank Records and Foreign Transactions Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951-
1959; The Mail and Wire Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343.
31. See ECONOMIC CRIME WORKSHOP, INTERNATIONAL TRADE - THE FRAUD
RISKS, Chapter 2 (January 1987).
32. See generally, Pines, supra note 5.
33. Cruver, supra note 5, at 2-4.
34. Id.
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C. The American Response
The public outcry resulted in passage of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act on December 19, 1977."5 As President Carter noted,
"[B]ribery is ethically repugnant and competitively unnecessary.
Corrupt practices between corporations and public officials
overseas undermine the integrity and stability of governments
and harm our relations with other countries ... 36
Most importantly, the Act upholds a valued moral standard
underlying the history and culture of the United States. As noted
in the Report issued by the House of Representatives on the Act,
The payment of bribes to influence the acts or decisions of
foreign officials, foreign political parties and candidates for
foreign political office is unethical. It is counter to the moral
expectations and values of the American public . . . . [Ilt
rewards corruption instead of efficiency and puts pressure on
ethical enterprises to lower their standards or risk losing
business.37
The Act was amended in 1988 to clarify and strengthen its
provisions in response to the business community's expressed
concern that, as originally drafted, the Act inhibited the ability of
United States companies to compete abroad."
IV. Breakdown of the Act's Provisions
The Act prohibits American companies and their agents, as
well as individuals, from using the mails or other means of
interstate commerce to make a payment "corruptly," either directly
or indirectly through an intermediary, to a foreign official or
politician to use his or her power or influence to help the American
firm or individual to obtain or retain business.39 The Act is
broad-reaching in defining potential targets, curbing illicit practices
of corporations under the auspices of the SEC, otherwise known as
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1988), originally enacted as Pub.
L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977); see ARTHUR ARONOFF, ANTIBRBERY
PROVISIONS OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACrIcES ACT (June 30, 1994).
36. See generally, Pines, supra note 5.
37. See generally, Pines, supra note 5, at 212, quoting H.R. Rep. No. 640, 95th
Cong., First Sess. 4-5 (1977).
38. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
Title V, Subtitle A, Part I, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-25 (1988).
39. Pines, supra note 5, at 188-89.
19971
520 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:3
"issuers," as well as the practices of all "domestic concerns," that
is any other corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock
company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole
proprietorship principally doing business in the United States or
organized under United States laws or the laws of any United
States territory, possession, or commonwealth.
The Act also reaches illicit practices of any United States
citizen, national or resident.' Although other countries prohibit
the bribing of their own officials, the United States is the only
nation in the world that I know of which punishes criminally its
business community for bribing another country's public ser-
vants.4
A. Accounting Provisions
The Act's use of comprehensive accounting standards is
particularly American in its approach to the detection and ultimate
prosecution of financial crime through the use of disclosure
requirements and regulatory oversight. Section 102 of the Act
requires corporations subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC (1) to
make and keep accurate books, records and accounts which
properly detail the corporation's business activities, and (2) to
create and maintain a system of internal accounting controls.
42
These provisions were intended to clarify that corporations' books
and records should reflect transactions that conform to accepted
accounting standards, should be designed to prevent off the books
transactions such as bribes, and should increase corporate accoun-
tability.
43
The accounting controls required by the Act are not limited to
quantitative accuracy and fairness but also include a requirement
of qualitative disclosure. Under the Act, corporations' books must
correctly record all information which may be necessary to call an
auditor's attention to any possible qualitative illegality or impropri-
ety. The financial details of a particular transaction may not tell
the whole story. If the transaction is being entered into as a result
of a "suggestion" by a foreign official, if the sums being disbursed
exceed sums paid in comparable transactions, or if there are
apparent conflicts of interest between the foreign parties engaging
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1).
41. Pines, supra note 5, at 205-06, 227 n.147.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2).
43. Cruver, supra note 5, at 20-22.
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in the transaction and the foreign official from whom a particular
entity wishes action, all this information must be disclosed."
Criminal liability for violations of the accounting standards
requires that the accused have knowingly circumvented a system of
internal accounting controls or have knowingly falsified records or
books maintained under the accounting requirements of the Act.45
B. Bribery and "Grease" Payments
Sections 103 and 104 create a new criminal offense intended to
reduce bribery of foreign government officials by United States-
based businesses.' The "foreign corrupt practices" prohibited by
the Act include five separate elements:
1. the use of an instrumentality of interstate commerce
(such as the telephone, telex, telecopies, air transpor-
tation, or the mails) in furtherance of
2. a payment of, or even an offer to pay, "anything of
value," directly or indirectly
3. to any foreign official, foreign political party, or
foreign political candidate,
4. if the purpose of the payment is the "corrupt" one of
getting the recipient to act (or to refrain from acting)
5. in such a way as to assist the company in obtaining or
retaining business or in directing business to any
particular person.47
These provisions apply to both businesses subject to the SEC's
jurisdiction, that is "issuers," and to all individuals and other
entities coming under the Act. The accounting provisions differ in
their reach, covering only the activities of "issuers."
Prosecutions can be brought not only for direct corrupt
payments but also for indirect corrupt payments made by third
parties if there is actual knowledge of the intended results or if
there is a conscious disregard or deliberate ignorance of known
circumstances that should reasonably alert the offender to the high
probability of violation of the Act.4
44. Id. at 22-23.
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(4) and (5).
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 and -2; supra note 8, see Defending Corporations,
supra note 27, at 197-98.
47. Cruver, supra note 5, at 15.
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a)(3), (h)(A) and (B); Aronoff, supra, n.17, § III E.
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As amended in 1988, the Act provides an explicit exception to
the bribery prohibition for small payments made to foreign officials
to ensure their performance of customary duties, known as
"grease" payments, or more specifically,
any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official,
political party, or party official the purpose of which is to
expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmen-
tal action by foreign official, political party, or party official.49
"Routine governmental action" does not include a decision by a
foreign official to award new business or to continue business with
a particular party or any action taken by a foreign official involved
in the decision making process to encourage a decision to award
new business to, or to continue business with, a particular party."0
Rather, "routine governmental action" is understood to mean
commonly performed official actions, such as:
* obtaining documents or permits to qualify to do business
in a foreign country;
* processing government papers, such as visas or work
permits;
* providing for police protection, delivery, or scheduling
inspections in connection with contract performance or transit
of goods through the country;
* providing phone service, power and water supply, cargo-
handling services, or protection for perishable commodities;
and
* actions of a similar nature.
51
C. Affirmative Defenses
There are also a variety of affirmative defenses under the Act
as amended in 1988. These defenses include:
(1) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of
value that was made, was lawful under the written law
and regulations of the foreign official's, political party's,
party official's, or candidate's country; or
(2) that the payment.., was a... reasonable and bona
fide business expenditure ... related to-
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(B).
51. Cruver, supra note 5, at 16.
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(A) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of
products or services;
(B) the execution or performance of a contract with a
foreign government or agency thereof.
5 2
The accounting requirements of the Act should serve to flush
out bribes that are concealed as business expenses. Nor can
American businesses avoid criminal and civil enforcement by
arguing that bribery and graft are customary in a foreign country,
as opposed to legally authorized, no matter how much the custom
permeates the fabric of business in that country.
D. Penalties
The maximum amount of the potential fines to firms violating
the Act is $2,000,000 and $100,000 for individuals and for officers,
directors and stockholders acting on behalf of the firm, as well as
imprisonment for up to five years, or both. 3 The Department of
Justice and the SEC can also bring civil actions and seek substantial
civil fines, as well as injunctive relief.'
E. Advisory Opinions
An extraordinary provision of the Act creates a review
procedure by the Department of Justice in which the Attorney
General is required to issue an opinion in response to a specific
inquiry from a person or firm. The opinion is meant to enable
companies to obtain a "before the fact" opinion as to whether
prospective conduct will conform to the Department of Justice's
current enforcement policy regarding the antibribery provisions of
the Act. Such an opinion creates a rebuttable presumption of
compliance with the Act, yet it is not binding on the SEC. In
spite of this governmental effort to be helpful, businesses have not
displayed much interest in the opinion procedure, relying more on
the advice of private counsel. There were only twenty opinions
released between 1980 and 1989.56 The Department of Justice,
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c).
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff(c) and 78dd-2(g).
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(d), 78dd-2(g)(1)(B), 78dd-2(g)(2)(C), 78ff(c)(1)(B),
78ff(c)(2)(C).
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(e), 78dd-2(f), 78m(b)(2) and (3); see Department of
Justice Manual 1993-1 Supplement, §§ 9-47:140 and 9-47.140A, Part 80, § 80.13.
56. See Beverley Earle, The United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and
the OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendation: When Moral Suasion Won't Work, Try
the Money Argument, 14 DicK. J. INT'L L. 207, 220-21 (1996).
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pursuant to the 1988 amendments to the Act, has adopted new
procedures which make supporting documents unreachable through
a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request.57
F Enforcement
The SEC is responsible for civil enforcement of the accounting
provisions of the Act and the antibribery provisions with respect to
issuers. The Department of Justice is responsible for all criminal
enforcement, for civil enforcement against individuals, and against
entities that are not under the SEC's jurisdiction. 8
V. Problems Remaining with the Act
Despite amendments, the Act still has a variety of problems
that prevent it from fully achieving its goals. One of these
problems is limited enforcement by the agencies entrusted with
enforcement jurisdiction, the SEC and the Department of Justice.
Only sixteen separate bribery allegations have been prosecuted
under the Act.59 Many factors can contribute to limited enforce-
ment. Initially, Congress has expressed concern about the
effectiveness of the agencies entrusted with the Act's enforcement,
the SEC and the Department of Justice. Neither agency has
complete control over enforcement of the Act, instead sharing that
responsibility. Some believe the agencies have displayed an
inability to cooperate effectively.' In addition, both agencies
have of late been overwhelmed by ever-expanding demands on
resources that have not been commensurately increased. Further,
changing priorities (as in the Department's recent offensive against
"deadbeat dads" for delinquent child support payments) can reduce
the resources brought to the anti-corruption fight.
Other factors impeding enforcement under the Act include
exceptionally high standards for the initiation of prosecution, as
well as the obvious difficulties in investigating and prosecuting
sophisticated and complex international commercial transactions.
Investigation and prosecution under the Act require interviews with
witnesses and the obtaining of documents from individuals and
57. Id.
58. Pines, supra note 5, at 189; ARONOFF, supra note 35, at §§ III C.
59. See Pendergast, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: an Overview of Almost
Twenty Years of Foreign Bribery Prosecution, 7 INT'L Q. 187 (1995).
60. Pines, supra, note 5, at 192-95.
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entities in foreign countries, a task complicated by financial,
diplomatic and political concerns.
61
The United States has entered into mutual assistance treaties
with other countries, including the Netherlands, Switzerland,
Greece, Nigeria and Colombia, which oblige a signatory nation to
assist in locating witnesses, in compelling persons to appear and
testify, and in producing documents and records. Where these
treaties are limited to the investigation and prosecution of crimes
recognized by the laws of both the United States and the other
nation, they would not include investigations of criminal violations
of the Act. There are also bilateral agreements governing the
transfer of information between the Department of Justice and
foreign law enforcement agencies, which are limited to the activities
of specified companies in the host countries.
62
The Act also continues to suffer from vagueness that hinders
its effectiveness. The scarcity of judicial decisions emanating from
prosecutions and civil actions has cut down on judicial clarification
of the gray areas in the Act. This is unfortunate in that lack of
clarity can have a chilling effect on business activities abroad. It is
not precisely clear what is meant by the Act's prohibition against
corporate use of the mails "corruptly" in furtherance of payments
to foreign officials. It is also unclear what constitutes a "payment,"
what is meant by the "knowing" standard in relation to liability for
intermediaries' illegal acts of bribery, when a foreign official is
engaged in an "official capacity" or a "legal duty," and what
constitutes a "routine governmental action."'
For example, businesses, of necessity, often use foreign
consultants. It is unclear under what circumstances a United States
business and the people who work for and invest in that business
can be held responsible for the corrupting practices of such a
consultant. It can also be problematic to distinguish between a
foreign official's "official" conduct and conduct undertaken for
personal or business reasons, a problem exacerbated by the lack of
substantive and administrative law in the countries involved.' 4
Some commentators have argued that the Act should be
amended to allow a restricted private right of action in order to
facilitate fair competition.65 In short, give a competitor harmed
61. Id.
62. Cruver, supra note 5, at 65-68.
63. Pines, supra note 5, at 200-03.
64. Id. at 200-02.
65. Id. at 215-27.
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by violations of the Act a right to sue. This would supplement
scarce Government resources with motivated, well-financed private
litigants. Although this approach would seem logical and appropri-
ate, there does not appear to be any domestic political support for
further "tilting the playing field" against American competitors,
given the lack of foreign action to crack down on foreign corrupters
of public officials.
Perhaps the lack of enthusiasm reflects the disinclination of
Government officials and businessmen to equip private parties with
an economic incentive and the legal right to challenge their actions,
either domestic or foreign. In addition, it is doubtful if American
or transnational businesses are interested in supplementing the
scarce Government resources now available to enforce the Act.
Similarly, salutary attempts by the private securities bar to imply a
right of action for violation of the Act and bring litigation against
corporate managements have been disallowed by the courts.'
Enactment of both would revitalize anti-corruption efforts in the
United States.
VI. International Response to the Act and to Bribery
A. International Reaction to the Act
The fall-out from this American condemnation of American
concerns engaging in "business as usual" overseas has been harsh,
with some critics calling the Act a form of "cultural imperia-
lism."'67 The foreign criticism may have been particularly vitriolic
because the Act was partially motivated by an endemic, expressed
American fear that the contagion of corruption, supposedly caught
abroad, would emigrate to the United States, corrupting otherwise
law-abiding domestic business. The Act was conceived as a
vigorous inoculation against this disease.
There is also overwhelming evidence that the exportation of
corruption by transnational companies, including American compa-
nies, has had disastrous effects on foreign nations, destabilizing
their governments, causing existing corrupt governments to retain
66. See Lamb v. Philip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1029 (6th Cir. 1990), cerL
denied, 498 U.S. 1086 (1991); Citicorp Int'l Trading Co. v. Western Oil & Ref. Co.,
771 F. Supp. 660 (S.D. N.Y. 1991); Shields ex rel. Sundstrand Corp. v. Erickson,
710 F. Supp. 686, 688 (N.D. IIl. 1989); Lewis ex rel. National Semiconductor Corp.
v. Sporck, 612 F. Supp. 1316, 1328-34 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
67. Pines, supra note 5, at 204.
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power at any cost, all resulting in poor economic development.'
Payments of bribes by United States corporations to foreign
officials and exposure of the practice figured significantly in the fall
of governments in Japan, Bolivia, Honduras, the Cook Islands, Italy
and the Netherlands.69 The United States Congress cited the
"world-wide outcry against the corrupting influence of some United
States-based multinationals on foreign governments" in passing the
original Act.70 Yet no one is so naive as to believe that only
American corporations' activities have had these effects. Other
national governments have been slow, however, to decry their own
corporations' illicit overseas activities.
B. International Action
Prior to passage of the Act in late 1977, certain international
agencies and organizations had expressed concern over the growing
problem of foreign bribes. Since passage of the Act and under
sustained lobbying efforts by the United States, these organizations
have increased their efforts to take concrete actions curbing such
illicit activities. To date, however, the United States is the only
nation to have criminalized overseas bribery.
In 1975, the United States obtained a resolution from the
General Assembly of the United Nations condemning bribery and
other corrupt practices in international commerce. Section five of
that resolution called for nations' cooperation to prevent such
practices. Thereafter, in 1979, the United Nations' Committee on
an International Agreement on Illicit Payments presented the
United Nations Economic and Social Council ("ECOSOC") with
a treaty outlawing overseas bribery that was heavily supported by
the United States. It was never adopted.'
The Act, as amended in 1988, directed the President to pursue
an international agreement among the members of the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") to
create legislation in their own countries aimed at attacking the
problem of international corruption.72 On May 27, 1994, the
OECD Council approved a Recommendation in which the
68. Earle, supra note 56, at 221-23.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 206-07.
71. See Stephen Muffler, Proposing a Treaty on the Prevention of International
Corrupt Payments: Cloning the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is not the Answer, 1
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 3, 8-13 (1995).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 note.
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members agreed that bribery distorts international competitive
conditions, that all countries share a responsibility to combat
bribery in international business transactions, and urging member
countries to criminalize overseas bribery. The OECD's Committee
on Investment and Multinational Enterprises established a working
group to follow up on the recommendations.73 Most recently, on
April 11, 1996, the OECD "[u]nder intense pressure from the
United States," agreed that bribes paid to foreign officials should
no longer be tax-deductible, and committed its 26 member nations
to rewrite their tax codes.74 Efforts by the United States to forge
a binding agreement among member nations of the OECD
criminalizing overseas bribery had failed, in large part due to the
efforts of a coalition led by Britain.75 However, the United States
appears to have succeeded partially in its lobbying efforts to forge
an OECD agreement making foreign bribery a crime.76
In March 1996, the Organization of American States ("OAS")
adopted the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. The
Convention calls for the criminalizing of transnational bribery by
member states, makes such acts of corruption extraditable offenses,
and calls for increased cooperation among member states, including
the establishment of "Central Authorities" to facilitate such
cooperation.77 On June 15, 1994, Justice Ministers from the
Council of Europe adopted a program to combat corruption at the
close of the Council's Nineteenth Conference. The United Nations,
through its Commission on International Trade Law, has also
adopted model laws for the procurement of goods and services
which challenge corruption in host countries.78
In March 1996, the International Chamber of Commerce
("ICC") announced a revised set of "Rules of Conduct to Combat
Extortion and Bribery in International Business Transactions,"
which prohibit extortion or bribery for any purpose. These rules
73. See ARONOFF, supra note 35, at § VII D; Earle, supra note 56, at 224-25.
74. See Marlise Simons, United States Enlists Other Rich Countries in a Move
to End Business Bribes to Foreign Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1996, at A7.
75. Earle, supra note 56, at 224-25; Muffler, supra, note 71, at 13-14, notes 60-
61.
76. Simons, supra note 74. David E. Sanger, 29 Nations Agree to a Bribery
Ban, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1997, at Al. Implementation could not be until 1999
at the earliest.
77. See Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, adopted Mar. 29,
1996, Organization of American States, OEA/Ser.K/XXXIV.lCICOR/doc.14/96
rev.2.
78. See Jay M. Vogelson, Corrupt Practices in the Conduct of International
Business, 30 INT'L LAW 193, 196-98 (1996).
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are non-binding and self-regulating. In 1977, the ICC had passed
an earlier set of rules which prohibited extortion and bribery only
in connection with obtaining or retaining business. In its corre-
sponding March 1996 Report, the ICC recommends that all
governments implement the May 1994 OECD Recommendation on
Bribery in International Business Transactions.
79
A private organization named Transparency International
("TI"), modeled on the structure and tactics of Amnesty Interna-
tional, was formed in 1993 to tackle the ethical dilemmas faced in
international business, which its supporters believe neither
governments nor corporations can successfully address. Based in
Berlin with offices around the world, TI receives financial support
from United States corporations and European aid agencies.
Through the use of public exposure, introduction of legislation in
other nations similar to the Act, and other tactics, TI is dedicated
to ending international kickbacks, bribes and corruption.8'
VII. The Act's Record
Has the Act been successful? No one really knows, or even
agrees on the criteria for success: stopping American participation
in foreign corruption or assisting American firms to be competi-
tive? Enactment certainly galvanized the United States to press for
international action. Yet, as shown above, progress has been slow
or nonexistent. United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor
has bitterly protested foreign indifference: "Last year from April
1994 to May 1995 the U.S. Government learned of almost 100 cases
in which foreign bribes undercut U.S. firms' ability to win contracts
valued at $45 billion. 81  Secretary of State Warren M.
Christopher claims that the Act's effectiveness has had a deleteri-
ous economic impact on American business abroad.' While there
is, as yet, to my knowledge no official study confirming these
claimed effects, 3 it appears reasonable to assume they exist.
There are also concrete examples of American businesses
invoking the Act to avoid the continuous blackmail and extortion-
ate relationships which an initial bribe or gift can yield, significantly
driving up the cost of doing business abroad. Colgate-Palmolive
79. See Report and Revised Rules on Corruption and Bribery in International
Business Transactions, International Chamber of Commerce (March 1996).
80. Earle, supra note 56, at 232; Muffler, supra note 71, at 12-13.
81. See Simons, supra note 74.
82. Pines, supra note 5, at 207-14; Earle, supra note 56, at 226.
83. Pines, supra note 5, at 207-14.
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successfully deflected demands for bribes from Chinese officials by
citing the Act's prohibitions against such payments. Colgate-
Palmolive ultimately opened a $20,000,000 factory in Guang Dong
in January of 1992 without the use of bribes.'
There is also a record of sixteen successful prosecutions.
Seventeen companies and thirty-three individuals have been
charged with violating the Act through the use of foreign bribes.
Fines on the corporate entities have ranged from $10,000 to
$3,450,000. Yet few executives have gone to jail. A brief discus-
sion of a few of these prosecutions shows the magnitude of the
commercial transactions and the bribes involved, the latter
representing sometimes up to twenty percent of the business
obtained. In July 1992, the General Electric Company, in the
Dotan case, admitted it had conspired with an Israeli general and
others to create bogus bills for fictitious Israeli Air Force projects.
General Electric pled guilty to four federal charges, including
violation of the Act, and agreed to pay $69,000,000 in fines and
settlement.
The SEC filed a civil injunctive action against Ashland Oil
Company and its former Chief Executive Officer, alleging that in
1980 they agreed to pay an entity controlled by an Omani govern-
ment official approximately $29,000,000 for a majority interest in
Midlands Chrome Inc., a Zimbabwean mining operation, in order
to obtain crude oil at a highly favorable price. The mining claims
were not profitable and in 1982 Ashland wrote off its investment.
In December 1982, Ashland was awarded a crude oil contract by
the Omani government for 20,000 barrels a day for one year at a
$3-per-barrel discount from the "selling price.
'8 6
In a criminal proceeding against Crawford Enterprises, the
Department of Justice alleged a scheme to bribe officials of Pemex,
the Mexican national oil company, to obtain orders for compression
equipment systems for use in Mexico's oil and natural gas industry.
The main defendants were convicted following a trial. Thereafter,
Pemex itself filed a major civil action against eighteen known
defendants and other unknown conspirators seeking more than
$45,000,000 in direct damages."
The multiple actions against Lockheed exemplify the tenacity
of corruption in the international marketplace and how some
84. Id.
85. Cruver, supra note 5, at 56; Pendergast, supra note 59, at 10-29.
86. Cruver, supra note 5, at 52.
87. Id. at 54-55.
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companies treat financial sanctions as a cost (albeit substantial) of
doing business abroad. In June 1979, after Lockheed admitted to
bribing Prince Bernhardt of the Netherlands, Lockheed entered a
plea of guilty based on its disclosure to the SEC of payments to
Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka. Thereafter, in June 1994,
Lockheed was indicted yet again for violations of the anti-bribery
provisions of the Act based on allegations of payments to an
Egyptian Parliament member, a Dr. Takla, who served as
Lockheed's consultant in Egypt between 1980 and 1990. The
indictment alleged that Lockheed agreed to pay Dr. Takla $600,000
for each C-130 aircraft sold to Egypt under an FMS program.
After auditors discovered the arrangement, Lockheed told the
Pentagon it would not pay the fee. It then paid Takla $1,000,000
into a Swiss bank account as a "termination fee."88 A Lockheed
executive pled guilty, and Lockheed was also convicted. A
Lockheed regional vice-president is a fugitive in Syria. Lockheed
paid a fine of $28,100,000 and $3,000,000 in civil false claims
damages.8 9
It also appears clear that the Act may only have succeeded in
causing firms to be more circumspect. Most recently, allegations
have surfaced in the press regarding IBM's payment of $20,000,000
to a subcontractor in connection with a $250,000,000 contract
awarded to IBM in 1994 to computerize Banco de la Nacion in
Argentina. As reported in the news, the contract, although
beneficial to IBM, is allegedly damaging to the Argentine state.
On July 31, 1996, a magistrate in Argentina charged 18 suspects,
including IBM executives and provincial bankers, with plotting to
defraud the Argentine government and inflating the price of the
computer contract with unnecessary costs and services. The
investigation focused on a $37,000,000 subcontract awarded to
CCR, a small software company linked to Juan Carlos Cattaneo,
alleged to be a power broker of Argentine's ruling party. The
money disappeared and was allegedly diverted to bank accounts in
Switzerland, Uruguay and the United States. The company
apparently performed no identifiable services in exchange for the
money. American prosecutors are looking into whether violations
88. Pendergast, supra note 59, at 28-29; Earle, supra note 56, at 211-13.
89. See Evan Jay Cutting, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: ABA-CLE White
Collar Crime 1996, Representing Corporations, Financial Institutions and their
Directors, Officers and Employees, 1-17-21 (1996).
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of the Act have occurred and if they have, enforcement and
prosecution should be forthcoming.
96
The uncomfortable fact, however, is that these few are the only
prosecutions in almost twenty years. And many were uncovered
not by the SEC or Department but almost adventitiously by the
press. It beggars the imagination to believe that corporations which
reported $400,000,000 in bribes so few years ago have been
reformed so totally. Without comprehensive international
investigations, no one will ever know.
VIII. Conclusion
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is a good-faith effort by the
United States to combat the use of bribery abroad by United States
companies that degrades and harms other nations' economic
development and our own moral welfare. The Department of
Justice and the SEC have tried to enforce the Act. Yet the
problems experienced by the United States in creating a workable
enforcement structure, solving investigatory needs, and clarifying
the activities outlawed under the Act, have hindered and will
continue to hinder its use. In fact, the most promising change to
spur legal action and enforcement, the addition of private rights of
action, have not to date been enacted, although such changes might
well result in an explosion of private enforcement. In spite of these
problems, the United States has had some success in prosecuting a
few egregious violations.
The United States has also tried to negotiate international
cooperation in fighting corruption. It has attempted to lead the
way both by criminalizing directly not merely the conduct involved
but also the corporate shenanigans necessary to conceal the
corruption. Although efforts by the United States to forge effective
international agreements criminalizing such practices have failed to
date, there has been significant movement and dialogue about the
issue resulting from the United States' repeated calls for interna-
tional enforcement and an apparent realization in some foreign
climes that corruption is a real threat to their own national security.
Yet, the entrenched nature of "influence peddling," "competition"
as a pernicious form of nationalism and other unethical practices in
many parts of the world may render them immune from effective
international condemnation. We can only hope that is not the case.
90. See Sebastian Rotela, IBM Scandal is Equal Parts Spectator Sport and
Lesson, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1996, at D1.
